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INTRODUCTION
Ecological economics has developed as a modern movement since the late 1980s.  
This movement has gathered together a variety of perspectives and interests 
concerned to address the modern environmental crisis.  A crisis because 
environmental degradation—species loss, long range transport of air pollutants, 
contamination of soil and water, introduction of synthetic chemicals, desertification, 
deforestation—has only belatedly been recognised as integrally linked to the way the 
economy is run. 
In economics appearance of environmental problems has been minimal and 
undertaken by sub-disciplinary areas which are easily sidelined and disregarded by 
both micro and macro economists.  Even amongst heterodox schools, where a voice 
might have been more readily expected to be heard, there has been little or nothing 
eg. post-Keynesians, critical institutionalists, neo-Marxists.  Economists of all schools 
have generally been able to ignore the evidence of environmental problems as 
having anything to do with their work.  That ‘real’ economics’ is about things like 
unemployment and inflation meant working on the environment could be easily 
dismissed as consigning oneself to irrelevance.  So what has changed? 
The environment is now a headline issue and controlling pollution is big 
business, eg. the European emissions trading scheme had an estimated worth of 
US$51 billion in 2007 (European Commission, 2008: 21) and US$80 billion in 2008 
(Kantner, 2008).  Since the early 1990s Nobel economic prize winners (eg. Arrow, 
Kahneman, Sen, Solow, Stiglitz) have been found imparting their wisdom on 
environmental matters,2 and some have even associated with ecological economists 
2  Kahneman is perhaps the most consistent having been associated with the work of environmental 
economist Jack Knetsch from his time in Vancouver at the University of British Columbia 1978-1993 
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(eg. Arrow, Sen).  The engagement of economists, or more accurately their stated 
interest, has risen sharply.  Thirty years ago the magazine The Economist published 
few articles on the environment and those which appeared were relegated to its 
science section—not anymore.  The high political profile given to human induced 
climate change and neo-liberal support for multi-billion dollar carbon trading markets 
would seem to have had something to do with this new found interest within the 
economic establishment. 
Unfortunately increased popularity does not necessarily indicate serious 
engagement with the subject matter even from the most hopeful sources.  For 
example, Amartya Sen appears a thoughtful writer on economics who has expressed 
ideas critical of orthodox economics and offered insights on development,3 poverty 
and gender issues.  In a rather overlooked book, he highlighted the role and 
importance of ethics in economics (Sen, 1987).  All this fits well with arguments for 
value pluralism as found in ecological economics.  Yet he gave a plenary at the 
International Society for ecological economics (ISEE) Conference in 2006 which was 
not only disappointing in offering little of substance specifically on the environment, 
but also finished-up expressing support for the monistic global cost-benefit analysis 
of the report by Stern (2006) on human induced climate change.  He later endorsed 
the published report with its placement of the issue within a pro-growth strategy.  
This support would seem in stark contrast to his ideas on economic development as 
opportunity, writings on problems with welfarism in economics, and general criticisms 
(Kahneman and Knetsch, 1992b).  He also contributed to early debates on contingent valuation (see 
Cummings, Brookshire and Schulze, 1986).  Arrow and Solow were involved on opposite sides of the 
Exxon Valdez oil spill legal case for compensation and the ensuing National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration panel on the use of the contingent valuation method for natural resource 
damage assessment (Arrow et al., 1993).  Sen (1995) also wrote commenting on contingent 
valuation.  Arrow and Stiglitz were authors for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change third 
assessment report (Arrow et al., 1996a; Arrow et al., 1996b). 
3  He has been attributed with inspiring the multiple criteria approach of the Human Development 
Index (HDI).  Note, this actually ignores environmental factors. 
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of using growth as a measure of well-being.  Sen, unlike some in his audience, was 
apparently unconcerned by, or perhaps unaware of, Stern’s underlying expected 
utility model, standard discounting approaches and use of GDP growth as means for 
justifying human action, or inaction, on this major environmental issue (see critique 
by Spash, 2007).  At the ISEE conference he seemed oblivious to any debates in 
ecological economics of direct relevance to his own work or the ways in which his 
own work might relate to environmental issues. 
That eminent figures in the economic establishment talk to but not about the 
environment is seriously problematic and brings into question the considerable 
rhetoric of environmental concern amongst economists.  The continued neglect of 
the environment as a core economic issue can be seen as deriving from the two 
ways in which it is approached.  First, is the treatment of environmental issues as 
special cases of more general theoretical constructs in mainstream economics.  This 
allows (both mainstream and heterodox) economists who are embedded in an 
establishment discourse to maintain their own preoccupations without needing to pay 
much attention to the specifics raised by environmental problems.  Second, is the 
recognition that serious attention to environmental reality leads to the need for a 
totally new approach based in political economy and interdisciplinary learning.  The 
former is thus the preferred approach for most economists.  The raison d’être of 
ecological economics is the latter.  Thus, work by ISEE Presidents Joan Martinez-
Alier (2002), Richard Norgaard (1994) and John Gowdy (1994) have addressed the 
social and political as much as the economic, while emphasising the need to learn 
from interactions with ecosystems.  A perhaps inevitable struggle has then been on-
going between this social ecological economics approach and those engaged-in 
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legitimising economics as an objective technical approach for engineering social 
efficiency while treating the environment as something external to the economy. 
This paper explores that struggle and some of the resulting confusion it has 
created for understanding the meaning and content of ecological economics.4  In 
order to be treated seriously ecologists have felt the need to adopt orthodox 
economic models and make alliances with figures from the mainstream.  The central 
contention of the current paper is that the environment and the economy are 
intertwined and neither can be meaningfully analysed independent of the societal 
context.  The importance of social, political, ethical and institutional factors is 
something which ecologists are not trained to detect and economists are trained to 
neglect.  The aim of this paper is to outline the discourse underlying the work which 
has been appearing as ecological economics and to explain how some is 
inappropriately classified.  Meanwhile there is other work dispersed across a range 
of fields which could easily be included within the bounds of relevance. 
In the next section I give a brief historical outline of the development of 
ecological economics.  This sketches the claim to deep historical roots but clearly 
identifies the modern movement as arising from late 20th Century environmentalism.  
Environmental Economics is then seen as an earlier failed attempt to challenge 
economic thinking.  This background shows how ecological economics was born into 
a divided and contested world.  Section 3 then explores specific divisions and 
conflict.  Examples are employed to explain how the movement became partially 
entrapped by an orthodox economic dialogue.  Rather than denying the relevance of 
these divisions I aim to clarify their causes and Section IV outlines these as both 
ideological and methodological.  The paper concludes that the only progressive way 
4 Some sections of this paper are based on the general introduction to Volume One of Spash (2009). 
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forward is to pursue social ecological economics as a heterodox movement in 
political economy. 
ROOTS OF THE MODERN MOVEMENT 
Ecological economics engages with a range of topics which recur across time and 
have been debated since the ancient Greeks. As such the subject matter includes 
the limits to wealth creation, the meaning of the “good life”, how to achieve well-
being individually and socially, ethics and behaviour, the epistemology of value, and 
the psychological and social impact of ostentatious consumption.  Threads of 
reasoning and ideas which are represented in the modern subject can be identified 
in a range of 18th and 19th Century sources and call upon many topics discarded or 
ignored by mainstream economists, including: the writings on social motivation of 
Adam Smith (1982 [1759]); population and poverty in Malthus (1986 [1798]); Jevons 
(1965 [1865]) on non-renewable energy dependence; John Stuart Mill’s (1848) 
steady-state economy; Marx (1867) on exploitation, class conflict and capital 
accumulation; and the evolutionary institutional analysis and ‘conspicuous 
consumption’ of Veblen (1991 [1899]).  The romantic critique of economics is also 
relevant and most notably the writings of Ruskin (1907 [1862]).  In ecological 
economics some limited forays have been made into this historical context (eg. 
Becker et al., 2005; Christensen, 1989; Smith, 1980; Spash, 1999), but most notably 
with respect to the energy-environment interface in the work by Martinez-Alier 
(1990).
While the subconscious roots may run deep, the conscious ones lie directly in 
the 1960s and 1970s, although a few economists during the 1940s and 1950s did 
express ideas in form and substance that are still current in ecological economics.  
Most notable is K. William Kapp who dedicated himself to exploring the relationship 
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between economics and the environment.  He wrote on history of thought and 
methodology (Kapp and Kapp, 1963), and produced an extensive empirically based 
institutional analyses of environmental problems (Kapp, 1950; 1978).  He also 
explored the relationship between science and society (Kapp, 1961).  Indeed the 
reason he is largely unknown is that his critique was so far ahead of its time in 
breadth and depth.  Ciriacy-Wantrup’s (1952) work on conservation, land and 
resource use is also noteworthy, not least for developing the concept of a safe-
minimum standard.  More generally, there is the work on modern industrial society of 
Polanyi (1944) and Galbraith (1969 [1958]; 2007 [1967]) covering the rise of self-
regulating market economies and the corporation, respectively.  Both at points link 
their thesis explicitly to environmental degradation.  Like Kapp, these authors offer 
classical institutional critiques of the economic process.  So, while few contributed at 
this time, some powerful ideas emerged which remain highly relevant to our 
understanding of environmental problems. 
The Emergence of Environmentalism 
In the 1960s a more general and popular awakening to environmental problems 
arrived with books such as Rachael Carson’s (1987) Silent Spring on agro-chemical 
pollution and Paul Ehrlich’s (1968) Population Bomb.  The issue of economic growth 
was also placed on the agenda (Boulding, 1966; Mishan, 1969).  In popular culture, 
the hippie movement raised the ideal of harmony with Nature, dematerialisation and 
alternative lifestyles (from self sufficiency to communes).  However the popular 
environmental literature really took-off in the 1970s and only then spread into 
economic debates.  Topics expanded from population growth (Ehrlich and Holdren, 
1971), to general limits to economic growth (Meadows et al., 1972), to questioning 
the means of production (Schumacher, 1973) and social impacts of growth (Hirsch, 
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1977).  Radical environmentalism was being born (Abbey, 1975), and an associated 
protest movement became institutionalised in non-governmental organisations from 
Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace to Earth First and Sea Shepherd. 
In economics the major factor that helped concentrate minds on 
environmental issues was the energy crisis (Commoner, 1976; Tanzer, 1974).  While 
this crisis was created by oil producers restricting supply leading to price increases, 
the general idea of economic dependence on finite non-renewable resources was 
brought back on the agenda after having been neglected since the 1800s.  There 
was inevitably also a backlash against environmental concern and defensive 
arguments from mainstream economists.  For example Beckerman not only attacked 
those raising concerns over finite natural resources (Beckerman, 1974), but also 
Kapp’s environmental work (see the reply to Beckerman by Kapp, 1978: 305-318). 
Such economists were and remain out of tune with public concern and the 
growing awareness of pollution as a techno-industrial threat to life on Earth.  The link 
of DDT to non-human and human birth defects was a starter.  Similar consequences 
were feared due to nuclear fallout from weapons testing.  In 1959, contamination of 
the food chain became evident when radioactive deposits were found in wheat and 
milk in the northern United States.  The result was to move testing underground, 
although France and China persisted with above ground testing and global pollution 
(eg. Simpson et al., 1981).  The new nuclear power industry, which supplied 
weapons grade plutonium, provided another environmental concern.  The threat of 
accidents and pollution became increasingly real from the reactor scare at 3 Mile 
Island in USA to the radioactive releases from the UK’s reprocessing plant at 
Windscale (renamed Sellafield in a rebranding exercise).  Fears of a major reactor 
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accident were ultimately realised with the catastrophe at Chernobyl in the 1980s and 
the resulting global nuclear fallout. 
Scientists debated the idea that air pollutants could be transported 
internationally.  This was contested into the 1980s and persistently denied by 
countries (eg. UK and Germany) responsible for large scale emission of sulphur 
dioxide and nitrous oxides from coal fired power stations.  Confirming the sources of 
acidic deposition impacting Scandinavian ecosystems became a political issue and 
an international research project.  Meanwhile, the aircraft industry’s proposal for 
large fleets of supersonic aircraft, as the future for international travel, raised the 
spectre of polluting the upper atmosphere and affecting global climate (d'Arge, 
1975).  Another global pollution problem to appear was the depletion of stratospheric 
ozone connected to the use of aerosol propellants, mainly chlorofluorocarbons at the 
time (Cumberland, Hibbs and Hoch, 1982). In a few short years pollution moved 
from being regarded as localised smog from domestic fires to international and 
global with numerous sources and seriously threatening consequences including 
genetic mutation and irreversible damage to ecosystems and their functioning. 
The Rise and Fall of Environmental Economics 
Environmental economics arose, along with the growing public awareness, as a 
direct response to such problems (see for example Kneese, 1971).  The promise of 
material wealth for all and post World War II optimism in the abilities of science and 
technology were faltering.  Boulding (1966) characterised the economy as being run 
like the wild west populated by cowboys exploiting resources, chucking their waste 
on the ground and riding away to infinite horizons where lay the promise of fresh 
resources and new environments to exploit; this was contrast with Earth as a closed 
system like a spaceship.  Economic growth was seen as positively misleading in 
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terms of the consequences for human society (Mishan, 1969).  The challenge was 
for a new approach to economics. 
Environmental economics then appeared both innovative and progressive, if 
not downright revolutionary.  For example, Bohm and Kneese (1971: ix-x) introduced 
their edited volume, The Economics of the Environment, stating that this was “a 
profession rethinking, extending, and revising its concepts, and finding new 
applications for them.”  They drew a parallel with “the ferment in the profession when 
the Keynesian revolution was in progress” and claimed history was in the making.  
The reality was a little different. 
Any serious challenge, by such key figures of the time, which might have 
been posed to orthodox economic methodology, its theoretical models, or even its 
non-environmental preoccupations, was muted.  Indeed, besides some passing 
rhetorical comments, time was mostly devoted to developing mainstream economic 
thought and applying this to environmental issues.  Materials balance theory brought 
in the laws of thermodynamics, but for compatibility with the mainstream this needed 
to fit within a general equilibrium framework (Kneese, Ayres and d'Arge, 1970).  
Pollution was seen as all pervasive (Hunt and d'Arge, 1973), but this needed to fit 
within an optimal control framework (d'Arge and Kogiku, 1973).  The environment 
was seen to involve a range of values neglected by and outside of economics 
(Krutilla, 1967), but these had to fit within cost-benefit analysis and a welfare 
theoretic framework (Kneese, 1984). 
Despite this innovation certainly did occur.  Environmental valuation in cost-
benefit analysis introduced new methods such as travel cost, hedonic pricing and 
contingent valuation.  The travel cost method was the earliest to be more fully 
developed (Clawson and Knetsch, 1966), while contingent valuation followed later 
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opening a whole new research agenda (Cummings, Brookshire and Schulze, 1986).  
Primary data collection from face to face interviews gave results that questioned the 
economic model of human psychology and motivation, and for some created 
interdisciplinary interactions (Spash, 2008a).  The theory behind values expanded 
from pure use to option, existence and bequest values (Krutilla, 1967; Krutilla and 
Fisher, 1978).  This contributed to discussions over the ethical basis of economics 
(Kneese and Schulze, 1985; Schulze and Brookshire, 1982; Schulze, Brookshire and 
Sandler, 1981).  Climate change and the treatment of future generations were also 
topics on the valuation agenda (d'Arge, 1979), which raised ethical concerns (d'Arge, 
Schulze and Brookshire, 1982; Spash and d'Arge, 1989). 
Working inside orthodox economics—preference utilitarianism, optimal control 
modelling, discounting, a monistic value system, and mathematics as a doctrine of 
rigour—heavily constrained criticism, innovation and the ability to address 
environmental and social problems.  For example, in the early 1980s a key workshop 
on contingent valuation was run by Cummings, Brookshire and Schulze (1986) 
bringing together a range of people including psychologists.  Those advocating the 
use of attitude-behaviour models from social psychology were extremely critical of 
their reception:  “We certainly underestimated the barriers to interdisciplinary 
communication.  Our proposal that economists consider the attitudes-behaviour 
literature has met with indifference or hostility.  CBS are no exception.” (Bishop and 
Heberlein, 1986: 141).  A second example is the experience of Jack Knetsch.  
Despite being a pioneer of travel cost and hedonic pricing Knetsch has also been 
highly critical of valuation practice (eg. Knetsch, 1994; 2005), and in particular its 
failure to learn from empirical evidence with respect to loss-gain differences 
(Knetsch, 1985; 1989; Knetsch and Sinden, 1984).  His work with Daniel Kahneman 
10
C.L. Spash 
provoked strong and defensive reactions, especially their paper on embedding 
(Kahneman and Knetsch, 1992b) which refers to willingness to pay under contingent 
valuation as the purchase of moral satisfaction rather than an exchange value. 
Getting the paper published in the main environmental economics journal proved 
problematic and it received some special critical treatment.5
Here then are the roots of dissension which would lead to ecological 
economics.  While some economists raised, but never answered, various questions, 
others followed arguments to their logical ends.  Those ends raised issues which just 
could not be addressed within the orthodox economic frame.  The entire thrust of the 
work towards a new and challenging research agenda seemed to be denied.  For 
example, long-range transport of multiple air pollutants from dispersed sources had 
been and remains a major topic of environmental concern. Yet environmental 
economists persisted in teaching a characterisation of pollution as a local problem 
between two actors, easily corrected as a one-off market failure, or worse as optimal 
due to transactions costs (a problem noted early on by Mishan, 1971).  By the mid-
1980s university education in the area was mainly limited to North America where 
the approach to topics was controlled and the curriculum restricted (eg. post 
graduate education excluding methodology and history of thought).  In this 
atmosphere ecological economics emerged as a challenge to the orthodoxy. 
ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS AS A CONFLICTED MOVEMENT 
Those economists voicing strong environmental critiques in the 1970s generally 
found themselves and their ideas marginalised within a decade.  The criticisms were 
5  After a protracted review process the article appeared simultaneously with a critique (Smith, 1992), 
commissioned by the Editor, and a reply by the authors (Kahneman and Knetsch, 1992a).  When a 
second critique was published the editor (Ron Cummings) refused the authors an opportunity to reply 
despite their concerns that they be allowed to defend their work.  Jack Knetsch personal 
communication June 2004 and January 2006.  Ironically this soon became the most highly cited 
article in the journal and has remained so, by far. 
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just too revolutionary. Kapp (1970a; 1970b) was pointing out the basic failure of a 
system which pushes costs onto others and characterises them as ‘externalities’, as 
if these were minor aberrations from outside an otherwise perfectly efficient system.  
Georgescu-Roegen (1971) wrote a major thesis on the importance of entropy for the 
economy which basically concluded that economic growth was infeasible over the 
long run and as a result policy needed fundamental reform.  His reasoning led to 
questioning human society from the size of population and the pressure placed upon 
systems, to the time allowed for change and the rate at which human systems 
impose change.  Economic systems were then inseparable from ethical judgments 
both concerning others currently living and future generations.  Herman Daly (1977; 
1992) came to the conclusion that the best option in the face of entropy laws and 
critiques of growth was to aim for a steady-state economy. 
The arrival of ecological economics in the late 1980s offered the potential of 
picking-up on such neglected literatures.  That at least became the hope of socio-
economist, for if the field were no different from the mainstream sub-fields of 
resource and environmental economics the entire exercise would be a rather 
pointless repetition of what had gone before.  However, developing a heterodox 
interdisciplinary research field with a distinct methodology and approach to society-
economy-environment interactions was not on everyone’s agenda and has involved 
conflict.
In an in-depth study, involving interviews with several noted ecological 
economists, Ropke (2004; 2005) found the international movement started by 
forming an uneasy alliance of divergent ecological and economic opinions on the 
basis of some very broad common concerns.  In general terms, the unifying positions 
might have been no more than the environment matters to the economy, the 
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environment is being degraded, ecology has important messages for economics 
which are being neglected.  Ecologists came forward who were passionate about 
connecting ecological understanding with socio-economics in order to better address 
environmental problems in the public arena.  Any economist prepared to talk to an 
ecologist concerning the environment was a bonus.  These ecologists then appear to 
have been largely (often wilfully) ignorant of differences between types of economist, 
and many remain so.  Yet such ecologists filled key roles running the ISEE and its 
journal.
The result was substantial involvement by economists supporting core 
neoclassical methodology and ideology.  This was further encouraged by the 
strategy for popular recognition and headline breaking articles in Science or Nature.
The bigger the name in the field the better for getting the environmental message 
across, and as far as economists are concerned that would clearly favour the 
orthodoxy.  A core group of ecologists—including Bob Costanza, Brian Walker, 
Paul Ehrlich, David Pimentel and Carl Folke—chose to associate with mainstream 
economic theorists such as Ken Arrow, Karl-Groan Maler and Partha Dasgupta.  The 
ISEE’s journal, originally controlled by Costanza, had mainstream economists placed 
on its Board and increasingly published much falling well within neoclassical thought, 
including the mechanistic equilibrium models and preference utilitarianism which so 
constrained the earlier endeavours of the more heterodox environmental 
economists.
David Pearce, a noted UK mainstream environmental economist and 
advocate of all pervasive monetary valuation, was an early Associate Editor of the 
journal who became increasingly hostile to anything heterodox.  He is particularly 
remembered for a 1996 plenary to the European Society for Ecological Economics 
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(ESEE) Conference in Saint Quentin en Yvelines where he questioned the reason 
for ecological economics as anything distinct from neoclassical thought (Røpke, 
2005: 271), and went on to point at Charles Perrings and rhetorically questioned his 
presence.  Pearce was not separated from the journal for another two years. 
Perrings, later an ISEE President, has himself pursued abstract modelling in 
the mode of resource economics (Perrings, 1987).  This confines ecological 
economics to optimal control models despite all the ensuing contradictions of 
squeezing and remoulding concepts to make them fit the method (see his collected 
works Perrings, 1997; and the review by Spash, 2000b).  This can be seen as 
following a line of reasoning—common amongst mainstream economists—that 
equates rigour with mathematical formalism; an argument flawed even within 
mathematics itself (see Dow, 2003).  So mainstream economic approaches were 
from the outset brought into ecological economics, although the aim for many had 
been explicitly to move away from this orthodoxy (eg. Söderbaum, 1999; 2008). 
The potential for divisiveness was apparent to some early on.  In 1990 the 
Swedish Beijer Institute was rebranded under ecological economics with a Board 
mixing orthodox economists (Dasgupta, Maler, Pearce, Zylicz) and ecologists 
(Ehrlich, Holling) with one heterodox economist (Daly).  The Institute was headed by 
Maler, the Board chaired by Dasgupta and two research programmes were directed 
by Perrings and Costanza.  As has been documented by Røpke (2005: 272) the 
decisions made by Dasgupta soon drove Daly to resign, which allowed the Beijer to 
concentrate on traditional mainstream economics with models linked to ecology.  
The attempt to capture what was fast becoming a successful new field relates to 
power in academia and the potential for wider political influence.  As Daly (quoted by 
Røpke, 2005: 272) has stated with respect to his experience at the Beijer: “I felt it 
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was a kind of take-over—here is something called ecological economics, it is 
beginning to get a little following, it might get in the way some day, let’s just take it 
over.”
As the field has matured these divisions have remained strong and resurfaced 
on occasion.  In 2002 the incoming journal Editor, Cutler Cleveland, expelled from 
the Board the more heterodox European representatives (including an Associate 
Editor, and both the founding and then current ESEE Presidents).  This went 
unnoticed by most people. In 2004 a more public controversy occurred over the 
award of the ISEE prize in the name of Kenneth Boulding.  The recipients were 
Dasgupta and Maler.  In the Society newsletter (distributed at the biennial 
conference) Perrings, then ISEE President, rejoiced in this as signifying a change 
towards the approach of the Beijer Institute i.e. mainstream economic formalism.  
However, the award came as something of a shock to many when announced at the 
opening session of the biennial ISEE conference.  It was debated and contested by 
the membership at the Society’s business meeting (Røpke, 2005: 284-285; 
Söderbaum, 2007: 212-213). Neither Dasgupta nor Maler had previously engaged 
with the wider community (eg. never attending the European conferences) nor been 
(nor are) members of ISEE.  Their work was felt by many to be incongruent with the 
developing field and Røpke (2004: 309) notes Maler’s dislike of socio-economics.  
Obviously those making this award had a different perspective and active 
involvement with the Beijer Institute appears a unifying factor.6
6  Three ecologists D.J. Rapport (Canada) Chair, Brian Walker (Australia), Buzz Holling (USA); one 
environmental scientist Kerry Turner (UK) and two economists Clem Tisdell (Australia) and 
Charles Perrings (UK now USA) ISEE President at the time of the award. 
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IDEOLOGICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL DIVISIONS 
A core group of ecologists writing on environmental policy issues have worked within 
the rhetoric of the economic orthodoxy despite their own heterodox backgrounds.  Of 
course ecology in some guises is an optimising and maximising discipline with 
deterministic mathematical equilibrium models.  In other guises it is dynamic 
questioning disciplines which push the boundaries of accepted knowledge.  
Modelling can be part of the latter, although in a rather different fashion than the 
former approach assumes (eg. Holling, 1986).  Yet treating environmental issues as 
just a technical or modelling problem, for economic and ecological scientists to solve 
is far too reductionist and mechanistic. 
Economics must be redefined as achieving sustained human well-being on 
the basis of the maintained health and functioning of Earth’s ecosystems.  There is 
then a dynamic and evolving interaction between human activity and the 
environment which is central to understanding the development of economic 
systems.  Mainstream thought is resistant to the idea of economic systems as 
dynamic evolving structures, something recognised long ago by Veblen (1898).  
Physics rather than biology has been the dominant comparator and methodological 
influence.  In contrast a methodology is necessary which moves away from a simple 
belief in mechanistic cause-effect relationships as explaining social interactions, 
something that was criticised by both Kapp (1978: 281-301) and Georgescu-Roegen 
(1979).  Interactions with ecology have then revived interest in biological concepts 
and metaphors within ecological economics. 
Most prominent amongst the biological/ecological concepts are ideas of 
sustainability, resilience and co-evolutionary development (Gowdy, 1994; Norgaard, 
1981; 1987; 1988).  In an evolving system concepts of equilibrium are abstractions 
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for convenience to describe specific states on a path of change.  This can be linked 
to ecosystems understanding in terms of cycles of energy and materials 
organisation, accumulation, destruction and release (Holling, 1986).  Managing and 
attempting to maintain systems in perceived equilibrium states can then prove 
disastrous, eg. preventing small fires in forests eventually resulting in large scale 
catastrophic fires.  At the same time not all attempts to merge economics and 
biology are accepted and in particularly those of the Chicago school have been 
rejected by prominent Ecological Economists (eg. Gowdy, 1987).  Amongst the 
alternative approaches within ecology and biology the non-reductionist strains are 
favoured.
Rejecting atomistic and mechanistic explanations as universal truths also 
leads to opening-up the black box of the individual.  Rather than regarding the 
human as some essentially irreducible atomic structure, which should remain 
unquestioned, the realm of motivation is revealed.  Psychology can then offer 
tremendous potential for insight into behaviour, but only if economists are prepared 
to learn from, rather than dominate, the subject (Earl, 2005).  Dropping the focus on 
self-interested utility maximisation leads to a rich array of possibilities.  Lexicographic 
preferences no longer appear as a strange exception to the rule of gross substitution 
but a relatively normal approach to choice (Spash, 1998; 2000a; Spash and Hanley, 
1995; Spash et al., 2000), which may be motivated by non-utilitarian ethics, strong 
uncertainty, or satisficing behaviour.  Needs can be differentiated from positional 
affluence.  Social norms provide a link between individual and societal motivators 
and connect with the role of institutions as explored by classical or critical 
institutional economists (as opposed to the neoclassical ‘new’ institutional 
economists).  Social organisations are then seen to involve perceptions as to power, 
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trust and control which impact how people respond to requests and incentives for 
behavioural change. 
These various insights have direct relevance for how economic growth is 
perceived to operate as a means for improving the human condition.  The ecological 
economics literature addressing consumption has connected critiques of consumer 
manipulation by corporations (Galbraith, 2007 [1967]; Kapp, 1978: 224-247), to the 
psychological and social roles material consumption plays in a modern market 
economy (Reisch and Ropke, 2004; Røpke, 1999).  The psychological treadmill of 
material throughput also raises concerns over the scale of growth (Daly, 1991; 
1992).  Growth as a driving objective is firmly related to the literature arising from 
thermodynamics and energy use with its implications for the physical functioning of 
systems (Georgescu-Roegen, 1971).  Specialist interest in this area has been 
expressed through the development of industrial ecology (Ayres and Ayres, 1996). 
That economic growth creates harms as well as goods is heavily downplayed 
in mainstream economics.  Signals of failure are clear in the persistence of 
distributional inequity, global poverty and the imposition of pollution and 
environmental degradation on the poor.  A popular response has been the call for 
new measures of economic development to address the failure of economics to 
improve well-being.  However, measuring the rate of environmental degradation 
seems to substitute for actually doing something about it.  On one side there seems 
to be a hope that the ‘right’ indicator will show things getting better (or at least no 
worse), and on the other that suddenly politicians will take action because a newly 
refined indicator disagrees with their ideologically preferred old one (GDP). 
Measurement and value issues in fact are high on the agenda of ecological 
economics.  This is because of the various attempts to get old messages into new 
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bottles to attract the economic and political audience.  For some, mainly ecologists 
and conservation biologists, large monetary numbers, regardless of their theoretical 
foundation, are all that is required.  For others physical numeraires of environmental 
impact are sought and ecological footprints proposed.  Yet others believe 
environmental economists were basically right all along and we just need more cost-
benefit type studies extending into ecosystems services (eg. Daily, 1997).  Hence a 
mix, or muddle, of literature has appeared claiming to fall within the bounds of 
ecological economics.  None of the above have addressed the basic problem of 
developing a coherent theory of value, nor learnt from the experience in economics.  
Traditional value systems in economics have failed, hence the effort to produce new 
measures and measurements in the first place. 
Economic value theory is derived from Benthamite utilitarianism converted 
into preference theory—a move which supposedly divorces choice from ethics.  In 
fact the basic philosophy remains utilitarian but now preference utilitarian as 
opposed to Bentham’s theory of total utility.7  What is found within the practice of 
environmental cost-benefit analysis is actually an implicit value theory based upon 
consequences telling what is right and the value of outcomes being measured in 
money as shorthand for welfare based upon individual preferences.  More than this, 
while preference theory and ‘new’ welfare economics claim to be based only upon 
ordinal preferences, the way in which money is used to aggregate and make 
decisions means it is being implicitly converted into a cardinal measure for 
interpersonal comparisons of well-being.  Yet such concerns are apparently too 
abstract for the new environmental pragmatists making-up numbers, and transferring 
them (see Spash and Vatn, 2006), on grounds of convenience and political impact. 
7  Polanyi (1944: 119) states that Bentham failed to make the link between value and utility.
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The clearest area of failure is then exposed when future generations are 
considered.  The paucity of argument and debate by economists here would be 
laughable if it were not taken so seriously and at such high levels.  Discount rates 
are meant to be observable objective determinants of how society should treat the 
future.  That is, economists claim, how future generations should be treated can be 
determined by observing a few factors such as rates of return on capital and 
consumption growth.  The result is a fruitless waste of time arguing over rates rather 
than addressing the fundamental issue which is fair and just treatment of the unborn 
and what should determine undertaking or denying actions with long-term impacts.  
Unable to move outside the narrow confines of mathematical formalism economists, 
from Nobel laureates down, then write-off the future on the basis that they are being 
empirical and objective while merely following what is efficient. 
That efficiency has come to dominate economics as a goal is interesting in 
itself and is ideologically driven (Bromley, 1990).  The insufficiency of such a goal is 
often remarked upon by economists themselves before venturing to ignore 
everything else and making all their policy recommendations on the basis of 
supposed efficiency analysis.  One thing ecology contributes is the realisation of 
alternative requirements arising from the non-human world.  Thus, concepts such as 
sustainability and resilience have appeared as strong independent goals not 
achieved by economic efficiency (eg. Common and Perrings, 1992).  However, there 
is also need for caution in learning from other disciplines.  There has been a 
tendency to take ecological concepts as new overarching goals which are universally 
applicable and from there make a jump to policy conclusions.  The unquestioning 
faith expressed in new guiding principles (eg. sustainability, resilience) then bears a 
parallel with the belief in natural laws, during the late 1700s and early 1800s, by 
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economists who wished to match the apparent progress of the natural sciences in 
discovering universal truths.  Sustaining something or increasing its resilience does 
not answer the fundamental questions of why and what for? 
Hence the rise of post normal science (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1990), as one 
means by which to rethink the science-policy interface and engage the technocentric 
establishment with wider public values (van der Sluijs et al., 2005).  Well-being in 
society, and social decision processes, require institutions which allow for the 
expression of different types of values.  This may be described as the need for value 
articulating institutions (Vatn, 2005).  Indeed the general hope amongst the various 
institutional options that might be developed is for a more inclusive participatory 
approach to governance which would allow deeper environmental values, than those 
prevalent in daily western life, to come to the fore.  Ecologists, or economists, simply 
plucking monetary numbers from the air to claim importance for ecosystems actually 
undermines this whole discourse and treats ecosystems as if some artefact for 
trading in a market (Spash, 2008b). 
The tradition of political economy being much stronger in Europe the range of 
social science interactions has also been much greater there leading to such things 
as post-normal science.  In the ESEE the field has become established as a 
heterodox socio-economic school of thought bridging the science-policy interface.  
The aim is very much to be able to address policy problems and environmental 
issues, not to sustain theoretical constructs for their own sake.  At the same time 
‘scientific’ standards of accumulating knowledge and understanding are seen as 
necessary for progress and theoretical consistency. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
This paper is premised on the basis that clearer lines need to be drawn between 
what is progressive in ecological economics and what lacks credibility.  Ecological 
economics as a modern movement started at the basic level of trying to combine 
models from two disciplines.  While linking ecology and economics was an 
interesting initial approach, many soon moved well beyond the narrow confines of 
model interactions, away from the multidisciplinary and on to interdisciplinary 
endeavours.  Such interdisciplinary learning means combining ideas and mutual 
reappraisal in the various disciplines.  Ecological economics cannot then be treated 
as a subject without a core social or socio-economic orientation. 
For social ecological economists interactions with ecology and biology have 
raised the profile of evolution in relation to economics. How we understand the world 
is vastly different if we treat it as a deterministic mechanical system or a chaotic 
evolving biological system.  The future becomes uncertain in a strong sense which 
denies our ability to predict.  This describes the large divide between reality and the 
technocentric ideological dream, and macroeconomic hope, that enough capital 
might be accumulated, via compound interest, to enable a leisure society.  A 
politically untenable reality is then that western economies actually reached 
satisfaction of basic needs long ago, but have persisted with expanding the scale of 
material and energy consumption which degrades the environment while failing to 
address declines in human social and psychological well-being or increases in the 
inequitable distribution of resources. 
Social ecological economics then best describes the subject as a field of 
research with a distinct ideological vision and specific methodological agenda.  
Ideologically there is a commitment to: environmental problems requiring behavioural 
22
C.L. Spash 
and systemic change, continued economic growth through material and energy 
consumption being unsustainable and politically divisive, poverty and distribution as 
major economic concerns, a need for balancing power (eg. individual, group, 
government, corporate) at different spatial scales (from the local to international), a 
central role for ethical debate, envisioning markets as social constructs with 
numerous flaws, political economy, design of alternative institutions, public 
participation empowerment and engagement as necessary to address the science-
policy interface, recognising the importance of ‘others’ both human and non-human.  
Methodologically distinct characteristics include: value pluralism, acknowledging 
incommensurability, interdisciplinarity, empiricism using quantitative and qualitative 
methods, rejection of mechanistic reductionist approaches, rejection of mathematical 
formalism and its claimed rigour, acceptance of strong uncertainty (i.e., ignorance 
and social indeterminacy). 
Differences and divisions have in many ways become clearer due to the 
developing alternative research agendas.  The inability of mainstream economists to 
engage with the ideas of social ecological economics is both ideological and 
methodological.  Such economists typically have various characteristics, for 
example, championing self-regulating market approaches, accepting the basic tenets 
of neoclassical theory, regarding humans within the narrow behavioural model of 
homo œconomicus.  Under this system of thought, economics is believed to gain 
rigour from using abstract mathematical models regardless of their empirical basis or 
policy relevance.  This is despite claims of scientific empiricism and prediction as 
providing validity.  In practice primary data collection is rare, theory is conducted 
without application or hypothesis testing and evidence contradicting theory is ignored 
or explained away.  In the extreme, arguments which persist are redefined for 
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incorporation within the existing theory by borrowing the language of other 
disciplines while neutering the concepts for the sake of conformity with existing belief 
structures and overall ideological positions.  All this mitigates the potential for 
learning from problem and policy oriented interdisciplinary research. 
The desire to combine different heterodox schools of thought—ecological, 
critical institutional, evolutionary, post-Keynesian—is in direct contrast to the drive for 
recognition within and by orthodox economics.  Ecologists and conservation 
biologists have then aligned themselves with those whom they believe hold political 
power rather than paying attention to methodological and ideological positions.  
Those taking this line may regard themselves as being pragmatic, in the sense of 
achieving an end by the easiest available means, but actually have created problems 
for those trying to be far more progressive in terms of changing economic thinking.  
Indeed much of the ecosystems services valuation work, for example, merely buys 
into an existing political economy in which no substantive effort is on the agenda for 
addressing the idea that material and energy growth can continue ad infinitum.  At 
the same time this work undercuts efforts to increase public participation and 
empower the disenfranchised by pretending that producing simple money numbers 
is a politically adequate response to global environmental problems.  The pragmatist 
argument both fails to achieve its aims and causes much damage along the way. 
Ecological economics was established as an outlet for critical thinking on 
economy-environment interactions, thinking which had been suppressed within the 
methodology and ideology of resource and environmental economics.  However, an 
orthodox aspect has been confusingly associated with the field due to the influence 
of two groups: those claiming to be pragmatic in the use of methods and those 
attempting to subsume the field within the orthodoxy in the tradition of economic 
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imperialism.  I have argued here that understanding the methodological and 
ideological divisions is important in defining the future direction for economic work on 
the environment and the only progressive way forward is social ecological 
economics.
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